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Abstract: This study evaluates shareholder wealth and profitability of 62  
large EU banks mergers and acquisitions that were involved in domestic or 
cross-border transactions during the period 1997−2007. We use the 
standardised cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) technique and a long 
window of 61 days to capture merger announcement wealth effects of both 
domestic and cross-border acquiring banks. We argue that standardising 
abnormal returns helps eliminate any biases in the estimation of wealth effects 
by giving equal weighting to all events surrounding the merger. Our results 
establish that, while the wealth effects of both types of mergers are negative, 
cross-border mergers create significant loss in shareholder value for the 
acquiring banks. Using standard determinants of profitability, we also conduct 
hierarchical regressions to ascertain the degree of merger impact on post-
acquisition profitability. The results show that acquiring banks’ capital strength 
and cost efficiency are most important factors influencing profitability in  
cross-border mergers. In contrast, profitability in the case of domestic mergers 
is driven more by the acquiring banks’ ability to take on greater risk. 
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1 Introduction 
There has been a surge in the number of bank mergers and acquisitions within the 
European Union (EU) in the last decade. Records show that domestic mergers have 
maintained steady growth in relation to cross-border or international mergers. For 
instance, between 1985 and 2001, only about one fifth of all merger transactions were 
cross-border while the rest were domestic, and banking sector mergers accounted for 
13% of such deals (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001). Mergers of domestic banks have tended 
to outperform international ones in terms of efficiency, particularly in developed 
economies. Amihud et al. (2002) assert that cross-border mergers in some respects give a 
picture of weak competition in the market. This supports the arguments of Berger et al. 
(2001), who find that cultural differences, supervisory structures and national currencies 
have inadvertently inhibited cross-border mergers in Europe. 
Countries with effective privatisation programmes have tended to attract foreign 
investors, particularly in the fragile banking sector. Most European countries with a 
privatised banking sector have been of particular interest for cross-border merger deals. 
Bonin and Abel (2000) find that privatisation has been a key influence in the high market 
shares of foreign banks in Europe. Conversely, economies with more stringent 
information requirements and a more effective supervisory system are more likely to win 
the confidence of foreign investors. They often have laid down more transparent 
disclosure and regulatory requirements which give vital information about their 
operations and performance. Thus banks in countries with such high regulatory standards 
will be more attractive to foreign acquirers. However, Berger et al. (2004) caution that if 
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such regulatory standards are too high, it may be a disincentive and could impede foreign 
interests from undertaking cross-border merger deals. 
The present study adds to the growing number of empirical studies of bank mergers in 
the EU in unique ways. First, it uses standardised abnormal returns for calculating 
shareholder value rather than the unstandardised returns popular in most merger studies. 
The standardised technique is unique as it eliminates biases resulting from uncontrolled 
events surrounding the announcement of mergers. In practice, the standardised abnormal 
returns create a level ground by sieving abnormal returns resulting from possible 
prejudices of the event. This is very important for prospective investors in making 
decisions on the abnormal returns basis. Second, our paper uses a long event window of 
60 days which is sufficient to capture post merger market reactions. Most studies use a 
short event window, which cloaks the stock reaction after the deals have taken place. 
Third, our study evaluates post merger profitability by comparing domestic and cross 
border acquiring banks, in contrast to previous merger studies which have focused 
exclusively on samples of either cross-border merger (Danbolt, 1995; Black et al., 2003; 
Amihud et al., 2002) or domestic mergers (Sudarsanma and Mahate, 2003; Hahn, 2007). 
Even where both samples of mergers are compared in some studies, analysis of 
shareholder returns is often done with short event windows. Finally, we have used 
profitability indicators for the acquiring banks using the banks’ five-year financial 
reports, which allows for an adequate assessment of the acquisition performance. 
The length of the event window can be critical in the analysis of the stock market 
response to a merger. For example, comparing abnormal returns with short and long 
windows may suggest a different assessment of performance for the same acquirers. 
Zollo and Meier (2008) confirm that a firm’s acquisition performance is often measured 
by computing abnormal returns over a short window around the announcement date. The 
difference in the acquisition performance between the short-term and the long-term lies in 
the market expectations and the actual outcome of the merger. While the former is 
focused on evaluating the premerger collective financial market expectations and events, 
the latter provides some basis for judging what has actually occurred during and/or after 
the merger. Thus, the longer window represents information based on ex ante as well as 
ex post performance of the merging or merged entities. 
The use of long windows has been favoured in some studies, as it provides a suitable 
basis for demonstrating the durability of the returns. Other studies (e.g., Lindblom and 
Von-Koch, 2002) have examined EU merger performance using a scorecard approach 
rather than the event window approach to capture the post-acquisition performance. Our 
study contrasts with previous studies by comparing the post-acquisition performance of 
both domestic and cross-border banks using a long event window to capture any 
intermediations after the acquisition. The combination of standardising the abnormal 
returns and using a long window to analyse stock market reaction to a merger is an added 
contribution of this paper. 
2 Studies in European domestic and cross-border bank mergers 
Merger studies of European countries have focused on different aspects of performance 
such as profitability, shareholder wealth creation, efficiency, productivity, etc. Some have 
focused on comparing performance in specific countries. For example, Martynova and 
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Renneborg (2009) investigate the differences between UK and Central European 
acquisitions and establish that the post announcement cumulative abnormal returns of UK 
targets are positively influenced by withdrawal of bids since investors are relieved at the 
announcement of bid withdrawal, as they expect more profitable bids, thus leading to the 
increase in abnormal returns. 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) distinguish between the wealth effects of domestic 
and cross-border acquisitions within Europe. Using long windows, they establish that the 
difference, although not statistically significant, depends on the status of the bids. 
Ekkayokkaya et al. (2009) reveal a significant difference in the gains from acquisitions 
within and outside the EU. Though there is a perceived decline in the number of merger 
activities in the EU, this has been affected by the worldwide increase in corporate 
restructuring. Campa and Hernando (2004) assert that the lack of a surge in cross-border 
transactions within the EU is an indication of legal, economic and cultural barriers to 
financial integration existing in the EU. 
Ongena and Penas (2009) investigate bondholders’ wealth effects of acquirers in 
domestic and cross-border European bank mergers that occurred over the period 
1998−2002, and concluded that the abnormal returns to bondholders of domestic mergers 
are higher than those of the cross-border banks. Their results indicate that domestic 
banks’ bondholders experience abnormal returns of up to 5% higher than those 
participating in the cross-border mergers especially if the acquirer bank comes from a 
country that has strict banking regulations. This finding is also supported by Aw and 
Chatterjee (2004) for UK acquisitions. Their results indicate that domestic acquisitions 
yield better returns than cross-border acquisitions, particularly those acquiring US targets. 
In particular, domestic acquirers show positive but non-significant abnormal returns in 
the six months following the merger announcement while cross-border acquirers are 
found to have significant negative returns. Various other studies, such as Danbolt (1995), 
Conn (2003) and Black et al. (2003), support this finding while examining cross-border 
acquisitions of publicly quoted targets. For instance, Conn (2003) observes that the 
resonant conclusion of the 15 cross-border merger studies reviewed is zero or negative 
abnormal returns to both the UK and the EU acquirers. Such returns are also common in 
domestic acquisitions (Sudarsanma and Mahate, 2003). 
However, more recent studies have expressed diverse opinions with regard to 
profitability, efficiency or wealth generation in comparisons between domestic and cross-
border acquirers. Mangold and Lippok (2008) compare shareholders’ wealth gains of 
cross-border and domestic acquirers among German firms, and find that mergers with 
non-EU targets generate positive abnormal returns while those with EU targets result in 
significant negative returns. Their findings also indicate that domestic acquirers create 
wealth, while cross-border acquirers destroy wealth. The wealth destruction in cross-
border acquisitions can be explained by the difficulties inherent in the post-merger 
integration of the entities owing to cultural, legal and economic obstacles. 
The above assertion is supported in a study of wealth effects for EU banks by Lensink 
and Maslennikova (2008) who find that domestic bank acquirers create shareholder value 
while cross-borders acquirers do not. Their study investigates the geographic and product 
market diversification hypotheses in which they applied the excess demand and the 
barriers to entry theories (Brewer et al., 2000) in order to explain how financial 
deregulations might influence cross-border integration of banks. The excess demand 
theory posits that as geographical restrictions to mergers are eliminated, the number of 
bidders competing for a given target will increase. This in turn increases the purchase 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Post-acquisition profitability of banks 5    
 
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
price paid by the acquirer. In most cases, the target might be overpriced with the 
subsequent long run effect of underperformance in relation to the abnormal returns of the 
merged bank. 
However, some studies support the assertion that domestic mergers create more value 
than cross-border mergers. For example, Bertrand and Zitouna (2008) find that the target 
performance in EU cross-border and domestic mergers differ significantly. The efficiency 
gains are found to be stronger in cross-border than in domestic mergers, and the 
difference is explained by the mechanism of the European economic integration process. 
The study debugs fears cast on cross-border acquisitions as they help enhance both 
shareholders value and the domestic economy. 
It is often argued that, for the cross-border acquirers to create more profits and wealth 
to the shareholders, they have to be distinctive in size and operation. Anand et al. (2005) 
add that only cross-border acquirers with multinational scope are capable of creating 
more profit and wealth for the shareholders. The implication is that only cross-border 
bank acquirers that are conglomerates are capable of generating more profits and returns 
for the investors. However, Ecko and Thornburn (2000) and Gregory and McCorriston 
(2004) study both private and quoted cross-border mergers involving multinational firms 
but find no evidence of significant returns. Longstreth (1990) identifies managerial 
control and level of investors’ participation as factors improving shareholders wealth. 
Hernando et al. (2009) in their study of EU bank mergers assert that the 
characteristics affecting the likelihood of acquisition are not much different between 
cross-border and domestic banks, but find that size and profitability are the most 
significant determinants differentiating between cross-border and domestic mergers. 
However, they find that cross-border acquirers are less likely to increase market share in 
the target domestic market. Cross-border acquirers are often attracted by the possibility of 
having a higher rent which might be readily available in more concentrated markets. 
Another factor explaining the difference in the long run merger performance of 
domestic and cross-border acquirers is associated with cultural differences. Conn et al. 
(2005) suggest that cultural differences remain an odd for the cross border acquirers 
especially when integration and acculturation are vital factors in the process. The greater 
the cultural gap, the worse the problem of the success of the deal for cross-border deals as 
opposed to domestic ones. However, taxes, accounting standards, the legal system and 
exchange rate volatility are found to have no significance in the returns and performance 
of the acquirers. 
3 Studies on performance of domestic and cross-border mergers 
The use of accounting-based data as a basis of measuring firm performance is quite 
common (Thanos and Papadakis, 2012; Salvary, 2003). While some studies have judged 
performance based on the stock market reaction around the announcement date of the 
merger, others have hinged judgement on the returns accruable to the investors. However, 
performance attribution considered alone can be misleading (Bertrand, 2005). Olson and 
Pagano (2005) indicate that any meaningful evaluation of a merger should be based on 
the acquirer’s long-term stock price performance rather than the short-term. Such  
long-term performance will include the returns to investors, dividend payout, and the 
stock price subsequent to the merger deal. Jacobs et al. (2012) used several accounting 
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and economic measures in estimating the performance of large firms with low cumulative 
abnormal returns on equity. 
Some important measures of merger performance apart from profitability include 
overlay strategy and elements of the returns to the assets (Houston and Ryngaert 1994; 
Mulvey et al., 2006) which can further improve the merged entity’s performance. These 
are cautious measures since accounting data may not provide the correct state of the 
merged bank in the short run especially in terms of costs and returns (Nnadi, 2009). 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that an efficient market may provide a better 
understanding of the market performance than the use of accounting data, since stock 
prices are mostly unbiased compared to financial accounting data that are often subjected 
to management influence. 
Previous financial performance of banks involved in mergers could be a crucial factor 
in the determination of the expected returns to shareholders. However, Berger and 
Humphrey (1992) argue that a deal involving an efficient bank acquiring an inefficient 
bank may result in reduction in operating costs through the elimination of  
X-inefficiencies. The contention is that the acquiring bank should be more profitable than 
the acquired and the revaluation of the share prices of the both banks should be related to 
the difference in their profits. This argument is supportive of the studies of Houston and 
Ryngaert (1994) and Morck et al. (1989) who find a significantly higher abnormal return 
in bank mergers involving more profitable bidder banks. Thus, bidder banks with a strong 
record of high profit profile will tend to produce merger deals which are more wealth 
creative than those where bidders have weak profit background. 
An expected overall impact of good merged banks would be an improvement in the 
lending rates and access to credit facilities to customers. Sapienza (2002) shows that 
when a merger involves domestic banks operating in the same geographic area, 
borrowers tend to benefit from good lending rates particularly if the acquired bank has 
small market shares. The findings of this study shows support for the argument that small 
borrowers benefit more in domestic mergers whereas large cross-border acquirer banks 
tend to do away with the small borrowers. 
In contrast, according to the claim made by Scott and Dunkelberg (2003), mergers 
have no noticeable effect on the ability of small firms to obtain loans but could trigger 
increase in poor service quality by small firms. However, when banks merge, the acquirer 
determines the merged bank’s lending policy. If the acquirer does not have a significant 
lending culture, this could impact on the small entrepreneurs who may find it difficult 
benefitting from the merger. Peek and Rosengren (1997) argue that a significant number 
of small banks who are involved in mergers usually have a business loan portfolio. The 
impact of this is the eventual promotion of small business financing. Thus the impact of 
mergers is often judged on the amount of support given to small business lending. 
Kosmidou et al. (2004) applied multi-criteria analysis using financial variables to 
compare the performance of domestic and cross-border banks in the UK. Their study 
reveals that on average, domestic banks have higher operating performance. Specifically, 
the domestic banks record high performance on the rate of their return on equity, loans to 
short-term funding ratio and net interest revenue to total assets. Their study supports the 
‘home advantage hypothesis’ which assumes that domestic banks are more efficient than 
foreign banks in their operational performance due to their knowledge of the local 
environment. 
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4 Methodology: event study, regression model and hypothesis 
The study applied the market model of the event study, using a window of 61days and an 
estimation period of 100 days. The sample consists of 62 EU banks deals, of which 42 are 
cross-border and 20 domestic, with a minimum deal value of €12 billion completed 
between the periods 1997 and 2007 (see Appendix for the list of countries and the 
number of banks involved in transactions each year). The sample of deals was obtained 
from the Thomson Reuters database. 
The normal returns are defined as the non-event returns that would have occurred in 
the absence of the event. The abnormal returns are the actual returns that occurred 
because of the announcement of the event minus the returns that would have occurred 
without the event. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the aggregate of all the 
abnormal returns (AR). 
The abnormal return (AR) is estimated using the market model as: 
jt jt j j mtAR R α β R= − − ×  (1) 
where ARjt is the abnormal return on share j for each day t in the event window; βj is the 
slope term of the return for stock j measured over the estimation period; Rmt is the return 
on the market m for each day t in the event window; Rjt is the return on share j for each 
day t in the event window; αj is the intercept term for share j measured over the 
estimation period. 
The abnormal returns were standardised to cater for the different degree of event 
impact. This is done by weighing the abnormal returns by the standard deviation. The 
purpose of the standardisation is to ensure that each abnormal return has the same 
variance (Serra, 2002). Thus, by dividing each firm’s abnormal residual by the standard 
deviation over the estimation period, each residual has an estimated variance of 1 and 
thus defined by the equation: 
2
jt
jt
jt
AR
SAR
S AR
=  (2) 
where SARjt is the SAR for firm j at time t and ARjt is the AR for firm j at time t. 
2 standard deviation of the  for the firm at the time .jtS AR AR j t=  
Square root of the variance of the AR for firm j at the time t equals the standard deviation 
of the AR for the firm j at the time t. The variance is given by the equation: 
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
31 ( . ) ( . )2
2100
. , 
31
. . 100
2
211
2
jjt est period AR est period
jt
jt
m est periodmt event window
j m est periodmt est periodt
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D
R R
D R R
− −
−=−
−
=−
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where 2
jtAR
S  is the variance of the AR for firm j at time t; D is the number of observed 
trading day returns for firm j over the estimation period; Rmt(event window) is the return on the 
market at time t over the event window; Rm(est. period) is the mean return on the market at 
time t over the estimation period; Rmt(est. period) is the return on the market at time t over the 
estimation period. 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the acquirer banks were obtained by first 
aggregating all the abnormal returns in the sample in order to draw the total inferences 
for the event under consideration (MacKinlay, 1997). The standardised cumulative 
abnormal returns (SCARs) were then calculated over the event period to ascertain the 
effect on the period surrounding the announcement of the mergers. The purpose is to 
determine the significance of the SCAR in both domestic and cross-border acquired 
banks. Although the event study method is very popular in finance (Frankfurter and 
McGoun, 1995), there are little known studies that have applied the SCAR methodology 
in combination with a long window to examine both domestic and cross-border acquired 
EU banks. 
Based on prior studies, our hypothesis seeks to establish whether the impact on 
shareholder value and the main drivers of profitability differ between domestic and cross-
border acquiring banks. The general hypothesis is thus stated as: 
H0 Cross-border and domestic mergers have different impact on shareholder value 
and profitability for the acquiring banks. 
Given the ease and ability of cross-border acquirers to attract capital, we posit that banks 
involved in cross-border mergers are far more likely to outperform the domestic acquired 
banks. Although the literature provides diverse findings on the performance of EU cross-
border versus domestic mergers, we consider that the mega size of the banks merger 
deals used in the sample makes our research different from previous studies. 
We used a hierarchical regression model to test the profitability hypothesis using data 
for both domestic and cross-border acquiring banks. The profitability equation is 
formulated using variables that are commonly employed in previous studies  
(Aw and Chatterjee, 2004; Berger et al., 2004) and include net interest income (NII), 
cost-to-income ratio (CIR), equity to asset ratio (EQTASS), loan to assets (LOANTAS), 
loan provisions to total assets (PROVTAS), and loss provisions to interest income (RISK) 
as the independent variables. Return on equity (ROE) is the measure of profitability used. 
The profitability regression is thus specified as: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6
    
  
it it it it it
it it it
Profitability β β NII β CIR β EQTASS β LOANTAS
β PROVTAS β RISK e
= + + + +
+ + +  
The event window employed to capture abnormal returns is 61 days. Some studies favour 
short windows of less than five days (Andrade et al., 2001; Mulherin and Boone, 2000; 
Campa and Hernando, 2006), which are prone to insensitivity to the chosen model for the 
expected returns; whereas a longer window takes into consideration possible bid revision 
and competitions (Conn et al., 2005). Using a long window also ensures that all possible 
factors that may influence the abnormal returns, such as post-merger events and the 
response of the market thereafter, are captured. Aw and Chatterjee (2004) opine that a 
longer window and estimation period ensure sufficient observations are achieved for 
statistical accuracy without running any risks of being far from the test period. 
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Thus, the present study leans towards using long-term window of −/+30 days (61 
days) and an estimation period of 100 days in order to capture the short market reaction 
of the merger announcement, and the profitability regressions (using financial ratios) to 
evaluate the long-term operational performance of the merged entities. Zollo and Meier 
(2008) confirm that long windows are far more reliable than short windows. This 
argument hinges on the widespread evidence of market imperfection associated with 
mergers, the effect of which can be mitigated by using a longer window. In fact, short 
windows are deemed to give misleading results since they capture more dominant 
cognitive performance. This research therefore takes a cautionary step to suggest the use 
of a longer window in estimating abnormal returns. Furthermore, we employ key 
financial ratios in profitability regressions to evaluate the operational performance of the 
bank mergers that occurred over a time span of 11 years. Such a long evaluation period is 
not common in previous studies of merger performance. 
5 Event studies results 
The results shown in Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 provide empirical insight on the pattern 
of the abnormal returns. While the cross-border acquirers show significant negative 
SCARs, the domestic acquirers have insignificant SCARs. Using 61 days window (+/−30 
days plus the event day), it can be established that many of the significant returns of the 
cross-border mergers occurred after announcement. The domestic banks show no 
significant returns throughout the event window. 
Table 1 Result of the cumulative total standardised abnormal returns 
Event 
days 
Cum 
TSAR+ Z-stat 
P-
value  
Event 
days 
Cum 
TSAR Z-stat 
P-
value 
−30 −12.25 −2.86 0.004*  18 −34.14 −2.80 0.005* 
 (−0.74)# (−0.16) (−0.87)   (−10.35) (−0.50) (0.61) 
−26 20.78 2.17 0.03*  21 −27.37 −2.18 0.03* 
 (1.87) (0.38) (0.71)   (−5.86) (−0.32) (0.75) 
−25 29.02 2.76 0.006*  22 −33.82 −2.37 0.018* 
 (5.14) (0.91) (0.36)   (−7.39) (−0.38) (0.71) 
−12 −38.19 −3.11 0.002*  23 −25.37 −2.07 0.038* 
 (−6.01) (−0.49) (0.63)   (−8.85) (−0.49) (0.62) 
−11 −25.38 −2.89 0.004*  25 −28.09 −2.43 0.015* 
 (−6.3) (0.33) (0.74)   (−9.101) (−0.38) (0.70) 
10 −28.03 −2.27 0.023*  26 −26.61 −2.68 0.008* 
 (−4.63) (−0.33) (0.74)   (−11.63) (−0.52) (0.60) 
11 −32.03 −2.23 0.026*  27 −30.57 −2.47 0.014* 
 (−5.57) (−0.3) (0.77)   (−14.62) (−0.58) (0.56) 
Notes: *Significant at 0.05. Only significant returns are shown in the table. 
#Figures in parentheses are for domestic mergers and those without are  
cross-border. 
SCAR (cumulative total standardised abnormal returns). 
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Table 1 Result of the cumulative total standardised abnormal returns (continued) 
Event 
days 
Cum 
TSAR+ Z-stat P-value  
Event 
days 
Cum 
TSAR Z-stat 
P-
value 
12 −34.81 −2.66 0.008*  28 −39.90 −3.03 0.002* 
 (−8.5) (−0.45) (0.65)   (−16.86) (−0.69) (0.49) 
13 −38.6 −2.83 0.004*  29 −38.41 −2.96 0.003* 
 (−12.9) (−0.68) (0.5)   (−18.33) (−0.75) (0.45) 
14 −27.3 −2.51 0.012*  30 −25.23 −2.25 0.024* 
 (11.43) (−0.59) (0.55)   (−21.44) (−0.98) (0.33) 
15 −28.2 −2.79 0.005*      
 (11.93) (−0.66) (0.51)      
16 −24.7 −2.88 0.003*      
 (11.61) (−0.66) (0.51)      
17 −41.5 −3.42 0.006*      
 (−8.6) (−0.47) (0.64)      
Notes: *Significant at 0.05. Only significant returns are shown in the table. 
#Figures in parentheses are for domestic mergers and those without are  
cross-border. 
SCAR (cumulative total standardised abnormal returns). 
Out of the 21 significant results in cross-border mergers, five occurred prior to 
announcement while 16 occurred after. Some reasons can be adduced as to why there are 
more significant abnormal returns of the cross-border banks after announcement date. 
The public confidence may have been affected which may trigger upward shock in the 
stock price of the banks. Since the cross-border bank samples are made up of large 
international banks, it is apparent that the merger would either build or decrease the 
confidence in the public. The results are further illustrated in the graphs below. 
The graph of cross-border SCARs shown in Figure 1 slopes down deep into negative 
to about −41.5%, just after the mergers but with an initial rise after the 10th day before 
falling back. But prior to the announcement, the highest SCAR was 29.02% which 
occurred on the 25th day before the merger news infiltrated the market. The abnormal 
returns were at peak just before the announcement date when the information filtered into 
the market, and fell slowly before day zero. The graph shows more significant negative 
abnormal returns (as shown in Table 2). The news of the mergers triggered an initial 
increase but with a subsequent fall in SCARs before the event day, which remain 
negative after the merger announcement. 
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Figure 1 Cross-border acquirer banks (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 2 Domestic acquirer banks (see online version for colours) 
 
Figure 2 gives a similar graph of SCARs for the domestic mergers. However, the 
illustration here shows a more sustained positive growth, although this is paradoxical as 
the SCARs are not significant. An interpretation is that the news of the merger triggered 
an initial rise in the value of the SCAR before its lowest fall on the event day to up to 
20%, which was reversed after the announcement leading to steady growth before 
eventually steeping downwards. The graph does not reflect the significance of SCAR but 
shows the pattern in the abnormal returns of the domestic acquirers. It shows that the 
slopes of the domestic acquirers move faster above zero (positive) than the cross-border 
acquirers. But the latter has more negative significant results than the former. 
Domestic acquirers have been adjudged to possess more knowledge of the local 
market than foreign acquirers. This may explain the rise in the SCAR, prior to the 
eventual fall, as the merger news infiltrates the market before announcement. Das and 
Sengupta (2001) averred to asymmetric information as an underlying factor for the 
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disparity in the growth of the abnormal returns of the domestic and foreign acquirers. The 
domestic banks are likely to know more about the preferences of domestic consumers 
than the cross-border acquirers. Their presence in the domestic market in related lines of 
activity often results in greater experience regarding household income and expenditure 
patterns, and household preferences for new products and brands. All this adds up to 
greater private information in the possession of the domestic banks and their 
advantageous position in the market during the merger period. 
The result obtained from the event study confirms that while the cross-border 
acquirers have more negative significant SCAR, on aggregate, the domestic acquirers 
bring relatively better returns to their shareholders. Some of the returns of the cross-
border acquirers are highly negative while those of the domestic are negative but 
relatively low. 
There are a handful of M&A studies that have used long event windows in estimating 
the abnormal returns. Table 2 provides a synopsis of some known studies and the event 
windows applied. Note that 60 days windows have been used in previous studies, but not 
in the context of cross-border versus domestic bank merger comparisons in the EU, and 
none of these studies have used the standardised abnormal return technique. 
Table 2 Some M&A studies and the length of the windows 
Study Domestic/cross-border 
Country/ 
continent Period 
Length of 
window 
Aw and Chatterjee 
(2004) 
Cross-border UK/Europe 1991−1996 24 
Campa and Hernando 
(2006) 
Both Europe 1998−2002 30 
Ang and Kohers (2001) Domestic USA 1984−1996 36 
Moeller et al. (2004) Domestic USA 1980−2001 36 
Rad and Beek (1999) Both Europe 1989−1996 40 
Black et al (2003) Cross-border USA 1985−1995 60 
Gregory and McCorrison 
(2004) 
Cross-border Europe 1985−1994 60 
Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) 
Both UK/Europe 1989−1999 60 
Baradwaj et al. (1990) Both USA 1980−1987 60 
Lowinski et al. (2004) Both Swiss/Europe 1990−2001 63 
The current study covers the period 1997−2007 for EU bank mergers and favours a long 
estimation period for computation of abnormal returns. The time coverage is significant 
because many EU mergers and acquisitions occurred during the period under 
consideration. Moreover, the 11 years post-merger profitability assessment period is 
necessary to properly capture any economic events that could impact on the acquisition 
results. Olson and Pagano (2005) argue that the success or failure of the banks M&A 
should not be solely judged on the estimation and announcement period but on the long-
term performance of the acquirers. The cumulative standardised abnormal return filters 
any unbalance resulting from the fluctuations in the returns during the event period and 
provides a fair basis to evaluate the performance of firms. 
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6 Robustness check 
To further ascertain the impact of the lengthy window used in the event study, we 
recalculated abnormal results using a short event window and without standardising the 
abnormal returns for both cross-border and domestic mergers. The results, shown in 
Table 3, indicate that the abnormal returns occur throughout the event period. The CARs 
are significant on (−3, 0) and (0, 1) for both domestic and cross-border acquirers and 
remain significant for the cross-border mergers during the event period. 
Table 3 Event study using short window and unstandardised abnormal returns 
Event days CAR+ Z-stat P-value 
−3 −25.04 −2.63 0.18* 
 (−9.20)# (−0.13) (0.23)* 
−1 −20.35 −2.47 0.07* 
 (−11.41) (−0.21) (0.69) 
0 −24.47 −2.31 0.04* 
 (−6.14) (−0.47) (0.55) 
1 −32.56 −2.76 0.36* 
 (−7.84) (−0.21) (0.07)* 
3 −22.53 −3.04 0.003* 
 (−10.12) (−0.12) (0.02) 
Notes: *Significant at 0.05. #Figures in parentheses are for domestic mergers while those 
without are for cross-border mergers. 
+CAR (cumulative abnormal returns). 
While cross-border CARs have higher negative values than for the domestic, the above 
results obviously differ from those with the long window and standardised CARs shown 
in Table 2. The short window and unstandardised CARs are popular in most M&A 
studies, but the technique does not consider fluctuations in events leading to and after the 
event. It assumes that information remains static during the event period. Such 
assumption has a huge impact on the abnormal results of the mergers. As seen in the 
results, standardised abnormal return sieves the impact created by circumstantial events 
surrounding the M&A, eliminating such makes a difference in the significance or 
otherwise of the abnormal returns. 
7 Empirical results 
The starting point of the profitability analyses was to ascertain the extent of correlation 
among the variables1 (ROE, NII, CIR, EQTASS, LOANTAS, PROVTAS and RISK) for 
both domestic and cross-border acquirers. Table 4 depicts the correlation matrix and 
indicates that ROE of the cross-border acquirer banks has correlations of 0.473 and 0.469 
respectively with CIR and RISK. Similarly, ROE of the domestic bank acquirers shows 
significant positive correlations of 0.472 and 0.433 with CIR and RISK. In both cases, the 
correlations are highly significant and indicate that higher profitability is associated with 
higher cost efficiency (CIR) and lending risk (RISK) of the acquirer banks. The high 
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correlation between ROE and RISK is common as found in previous merger profitability 
studies (Zhou and Wong, 2008; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007, DeYoung, 1999). 
However, the correlations show some differences in the associations of the variables 
between domestic and cross-border banks. For example, LOANTAS shows a negative 
correlation of −0.302 with ROE for the cross-border banks, an indication that debt level 
of the bank (or leverage) relates to the higher profitability; whereas PROVTAS has a high 
positive correlation with ROE at 0.472 for the domestic banks, suggesting that higher 
profitability of the domestic acquirers is related to more exposure to riskier lending. 
Table 4 Correlation matrix of M&A profitability variables 
 ROE NII EQTASS CIR LOANTAS PROVTAS RISK 
ROE 1       
NII 0.061 1      
 (0.035)       
EQTASS −0.061 1.000 1     
 (0.212*) (0.101)      
CIR 0.473** 0.287* 0.287* 1    
 (0.472**) (0.207) (0.264*)     
LOANTAS −0.302* −0.142 0.142 0.210 1   
 (−0.012) (0.118) (0.220*) (−0.450**)    
PROVTAS 0.069 0.064 0.064 0.067 0.377* 1  
 (0.461**) (0.304*) (0.492**) (0.258*) (0.080)   
RISK 0.469** 0.176 0.176 0.084 0.078 0.413* 1 
 (0.433**) (0.025) (−0.039) (−0.099) (0.177) (0.480**)  
Note: **, * significant at 0.01, 0.05 respectively. Figures in parentheses are for domestic 
and those without for cross-border mergers. 
  The variables include: return on equity (ROE), net interest income (NII) and cost 
efficiency ratio (CIR) as (alternative) indicators of profitability associated efficient 
operation of banks. The equity/total asset (EQTASS) measures the contribution of 
the capital structure of the bank to its performance. It also explains the profits 
arising from the quality of the banks’ assets. Net loans to total assets (LOANTAS) 
and the loan loss provision to total assets (PROVTAS) both measure the liquidity 
of the banks. They capture the banks financial position, investments strategy and 
funding methods. The loan loss provisions to net interest revenue (RISK) pictures 
the risky nature of the bank loan and the net effect on its liquidity and profitability 
while the total assets indicates the size of the banks. Same variables apply for both 
cross-border and domestic banks acquirers. 
8 Regression results 
The regression results for profitability are shown in Tables 5 and 6 for domestic and  
cross-border acquirers banks respectively. In each case, the results are segmented into 
four models.2 The Model summary (Models 1−4) provides an indication of the extent of 
contributions made by each of the variables used in assessing acquirers’ financial 
performance. For example, in the case of the domestic acquirers (Table 5), the R square 
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in Model 4 shows a value of 49.6% on the bank’s financial performance, of which 40.6% 
(R square change) is attributable to the addition of the RISK variable (over Model 3). 
Table 5 Hierarchical regression results of the domestic acquiring banks 
Dependent variable = ROE 
Regressor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 16.605*** 17.367*** 21.472*** 25.961*** 
 (4.478) (4.594) (4.591) (4.001) 
NII −1.270 −0.931 −0.893 −0.798 
 (−2.318) (−1.456) (−1.424) (1.113) 
CIR −0.079 −0.067 −0.076 −0.065 
 (−1.472) (−1.216) (−1.417) (−1.144) 
EQTASS  −0.067 −0.222 −0.369 
  (−1.026) (−0.683) (−0.984) 
LOANTAS   0.083** 0.250** 
   (1.859) (1.940) 
PROVTAS   0.338 0.100 
   (0.989) (0.673) 
RISK    0.063** 
    (1.757) 
R2    0.496 
Adj. R2    0.491 
SE of regression    9.110 
R2 change    0.406 
F-statistics    0.000 
Note: ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, the value for each 
estimate is the beta coefficient with t-statistics in parentheses. 
The estimated coefficients of LOANTAS and RISK in Model 4 are positive and 
statistically significant at the 5% level, with a marginal impact of 25% and 6.3% 
respectively, indicating that each makes a significant contribution to the profitability of 
the acquiring banks. Although the rest of the independent variables are not significant, 
the overall regression is as shown by the value of the F-statistic of 0.000. 
Banks use loan loss provisions in creating reserves to cushion the expected losses in 
their loan portfolios. As both LOANTAS and RISK measure the exposure to credit risk of 
the banks after mergers, the significance of these variables are indications that the 
mergers invoked anticipations in loan to customers and thus creating extra risk in further 
provisions of bad and doubtful debts after the mergers. However, these are by no means 
accidental but suggest that the mergers can have a significant shift in the debts and 
investment strategy of the banks. 
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Table 6 Hierarchical regression results of the cross-border acquiring banks 
Dependent variable = ROE 
Regressor Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 40.468*** 45.590*** 45.793*** 68.402*** 
 (7.656) (9.077) (7.968) (7.432) 
NII 0.863 2.929** 2.933** 2.167** 
 (0.981) (3.096) (3.034) (2.240) 
CIR 0.445*** 0.451*** 0.419*** 0.497*** 
 (6.437) (7.075) (5.713) (6.634) 
EQTASS  1.628*** 1.516*** 0.648*** 
  (4.246) (3.676) (4.132) 
LOANTAS   -0.046 -0.088 
   (-0.826) (-0.582) 
PROVTAS   0.262 0.489 
   (0.528) (1.011) 
RISK    -0.046 
    (-0.783) 
R2    0.514 
Adj. R2    0.510 
SE of regression    5.983 
R2 change    0.052 
F-statistics    0.011 
Note: ***; **; * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively, the value for 
each estimate is the beta coefficient with t-statistics are in parentheses. 
The regression results for the cross-border acquiring banks, presented in Table 6, shows 
the value of R square (Model 4) of 51.4%, of which only 5.2% (R square change) is 
attributable to the inclusion of RISK (over Model 3). This indicates that, in contrast to 
domestic, cross-border bank acquirers are not affected significantly by the risk element 
influencing their profitability. 
However, cross-border acquirer banks’ profitability is significantly influenced by cost 
efficiency and capital strength, as depicted by the positive coefficient estimates of CIR 
and EQTASS both of which are statistically significant at 1% level. The magnitude of 
these estimates shows that, in the order of predictability, EQTASS is the strongest 
predictor of financial performance of the acquiring banks, with a marginal impact of 
64.8%, followed by CIR with a marginal impact of 49.7% on the profitability. Apart from 
CIR and EQTASS, net interest income (NII) also contributes positively to the profitability. 
Their significant contributions explain the overall significance of the regression with the 
F-statistics value of 0.011. 
The significance of EQTASS is an indication that profits’ arising from the quality of 
the banks’ assets is an important variable in enhancing the performance of the cross-
border acquiring banks. This finding leans support to Goddard et al. (2004) who assert 
that an increase in capital-to-assets ratio will subsequently increase the profitability of the 
banks. In a recent study, Filbeck et al. (2011) also confirm that size of a bank as 
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measured by it total assets has a significant impact on its performance. Large banks have 
a greater tendency to exhibit high profitability (Sufian, 2009). Also, efficiency in 
management of expenses relative to income is important, as confirmed by the 
significance of CIR. Profitability is enhanced when the acquiring bank deploys its capital 
and utilises its resources effectively in cross-border mergers. 
9 Conclusions 
This paper evaluates the impact on shareholder value and acquiring banks’ profitability 
based on a sample of 62 large bank mergers that occurred in the EU over the period 
1997−2007, distinguishing between domestic and cross-border mergers. A contribution 
of the paper is the use of a long window (16 days) and standardised cumulative abnormal 
returns (SCAR) for calculating shareholder value. 
For both domestic and cross-border mergers the impact on shareholder value is 
negative. However, the SCAR of the domestic banks acquirers shows more volatility but 
no significance while shareholders of the cross-border acquiring banks incur significant 
negative SCAR usually after the merger announcement. This suggests that cross-border 
mergers create significant loss of shareholder value for the acquiring banks. 
In the case of cross-border mergers, the acquiring banks’ profitability is significantly 
influenced by equity-to-assets (EQTASS) and cost efficiency (CIR) ratios. This implies 
that to enhance the profitability of the merged entities, efficiency in the management of 
cost and capital strength are the most important factors. Since cross-border acquirers are 
usually large, their capital strength is expected to also reflect their size. Hence the result 
confirms the assertion of Anand et al. (2005) that cross-border acquirers with 
multinational scope record significant financial gains in terms of profitability and 
shareholder value. In addition to CIR and EQTASS, net interest income (NII) also has a 
significant effect on the profitability of cross-border banks. 
In the case of domestic mergers, while CIR, RISK and PROVTAS of the acquiring 
banks correlate significantly with ROE, the regressions regression results indicate that 
LOANTAS and RISK are the main determinants influencing the post-acquisition 
profitability of the banks. This implies that for domestic mergers management of risk 
associated with loan size and portfolio are the key elements in the achievement of 
profitability for the acquiring banks. 
Thus, we find significant differences in the comparison of wealth effects and drivers 
of profitability of the domestic and cross-border acquiring banks in the EU. In addition to 
these findings, our study highlights the potential usefulness of applying long windows 
and SCAR. The use of short windows and unstandardized abnormal returns will imply 
that fluctuations surrounding the event period are not fully accounted for, the effect of 
which impacts on the significance of the abnormal returns. The use of standardised 
abnormal results eliminates the bias in the estimation of event returns by giving equal 
weighting to all events surrounding the merger while the long window provides a suitable 
basis for capturing wealth effects of merger announcements over a reasonable amount of 
time. 
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Notes 
1 See variable definitions in the Appendix. 
2 The essence of the segmentation was to assess the impact of each set of independent variables 
on the financial performance of the acquirers and assessing the significance of the added 
variables and contribution to R2. At the same time, the hierarchical regressions allow for ease 
of control of the regressors while assessing the rate of impact on the overall result by some 
other variables of interest (Pallant, 2006). 
Appendix 
Definition of variables and sample. 
EQTASS the equity to total assets ratio 
CIR the cost to income ratio 
LOANTAS the loan to total assets, which is a proxy for liquidity 
RISK the loss provision to net interest revenue, indicating the ratio of risky 
lending 
PROVTAS the loan provisions to total assets; this represents the liquidity of the bank 
SCAR the cumulative total standardised abnormal return, proxy for M&A 
NII the net interest income 
ROE return on equity, proxy for profitability 
List of EU countries and number of acquisitions in the study 
Type of acquisition  Total per year 
Year Country of acquirer 
Cross-border Domestic  
1997 Italy 0 2 2 
1998 Spain 1 0  
 France 1 0 2 
1999 Spain 1 1  
 Italy 0 1  
 Germany 1 0  
 Austria 1 0 5 
2000 Spain 2 0  
 Slovenia 0 1  
 Italy 1 0  
 Germany 1 0  
 United Kingdom 0 1 6 
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List of EU countries and number of acquisitions in the study (continued) 
Type of acquisition  Total per year 
Year Country of acquirer 
Cross-border Domestic  
2001 France 3 0  
 Spain 1 1  
 Italy 2 0  
 United Kingdom 1 0 8 
2002 Greece 0 1  
 Belgium 1 0  
 Germany 1 0  
 Italy 1 1 5 
2003 Germany 1 0  
 France 1 1  
 Greece 0 1  
 Italy 0 1 5 
2004 France 1 0  
 Spain 0 1  
 United Kingdom 2 0 4 
2005 United Kingdom 1 0  
 Austria 1 0  
 Sweden 1 0  
 Italy 2 1  
 Germany 0 1 6 
2006 Germany 0 2  
 Italy 4 1  
 France 2 0  
 United Kingdom 1 0  
 Spain 2 0  
 Cyprus 1 0  
 Portugal 1 0 14 
2007 Italy 1 2  
 Greece 1 0  
 Belgium 0 1 5 
Totals  42 20 62 
 
